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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Williams v. lllinois,2 the Supreme Court held that a government expert's testimony 
about a DNA report, absent cross-examination of the technician who prepared the report and a 
showing that that particular technician was unavailable to testify, did not violate the 
Confrontation Clause because the report was not introduced for the truth of the matter asserted 
and because the report itself was non-testimonial. However, with five Justices expressly 
rejecting the entirety of the plurality's analysis, no majority agreed on the reasoning underlying 
the decision. The absence of a majority or a clear determination as to which, if any, of the 
plurality's grounds is the "narrowest" has left lower courts with even less guidance as to what 
constitutes "testimonial" evidence going forward. Both the plurality's and Justice Thomas's test 
run afoul of earlier Confrontation Clause precedents and set the stage for Crawford v. 
Washington to be overruled, in favor of the amorphous concept of reliability that the Court cast 
aside almost a decade ago. 
In Part II, this Note provides an overview of the major Confrontation Clause cases before 
Williams, including Roberts v. Ohio, Crawford v. Washington, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 
and Bullcoming v. New Mexico. Part III details the various opinions set forth by the Court in 
2 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). 
2 
Williams v. Illinois. Part IV evaluates and predicts the future of the Confrontation Clause in light 
of the fractured opinion in Williams v. Illinois. 
II. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AT ITS ROOTS: CRAWFORD V. 
WASHINGTON AND ITS PROGENY 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that in criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with witnesses against him.3 The 
Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as providing various guarantees to the criminal 
defendant, most importantly, the right to vigorous cross-examination.4 Although the Supreme 
Court's recent jurisprudence has further complicated the Confrontation Clause landscape, such 
confusion is nothing new.5 Ever since the Court's 1899 decision, Kirby v. United States, courts 
have struggled to define the scope of this constitutional right. 6 Despite such ongoing confusion 
and uncertainty, the Supreme Court did not make a major ruling implicating the Confrontation 
Clause until Pointer v. Texasin 1965.7 
a. Ohio v. Roberts 
It took another fifteen years for the Supreme Court to articulate any sort of substantive 
framework as to how to evaluate the scope of the Sixth Amendment. In Ohio v. Roberts, the 
Court held that the right to confrontation does not bar admission of an unavailable witness' 
3 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
4 David Crump, Overruling Crawford v. Washington: Why and How, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 115, 118 (2012). 
5 Hon. G. Ross Anderson Jr., Returning to Confrontation Clause Sanity: The Supreme Court (Finally) Retreats from 
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, in 60 THE FED. LAW. THE MAG. OF THE FED. BAR ASS'N, Mar. 2013, at 67, 68. 
available at http://www.fedbar.org/PDFs/march 13-entire.pdf.aspx?FT=.pdf. 
6 174 U.S. 47, 56 (1899) (discussing whether the Sixth Amendment guarantees that a defendant being tried for 
receipt of stolen property has the right to confront evidence regarding the stolen status of that property: "This precise 
question has never been before this court, and we are not away of any adjudged case which is in all respects like the 
fresent one."). 




statement against a criminal defendant if the statement bears "adequate indicia of reliability."8 
This standard could be satisfied in either of two ways: first, any hearsay statement meeting a 
"firmly rooted" hearsay exception qualified as bearing an adequate indicia of reliability; second, 
a statement that did not satisfy a firmly rooted exception could nevertheless be admitted if it bore 
other "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 9 Although a valiant first attempt, the 
Roberts framework was quickly criticized as unclear and unstable, insufficiently protective of 
defendants' rights, and contrary to the text and the history of the Confrontation Clause. 10 
b. Crawford v. Washington 
Twenty-five "murky, subjective, inconsistent, and unworkable" years later, the Supreme 
Court overruled Ohio v. Roberts and effected a drastic change in Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence in Crawford v. Washington. 11 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in a 7-2 
decision, took issue with the "malleable standard" of Roberts and found it inconsistent with the 
original meaning of the Confrontation Clause. 12 He stated, "[the Confrontation Clause] 
commands not that the evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular 
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross examination." 13 In rejecting Roberts, the Court 
adopted a fundamentally new interpretation of the confrontation right and held "[t]estimonial 
statements of witnesses absent from trial [can be] admitted only where the declarant 1s 
unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine."14 
8 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
9 !d. at 100. 
10 Dylan 0. Keenan, Confronting Crawford v. Washington in the Lower Courts, 122 YALE L. J. 782, 791 (20 12). 
11 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice 
Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants? 94 GEO. L. J. 183, 189 (2005) 
12 Crawford, 448 U.S. at 60. 
13 Jd. at 61. 
14 /d. at 59. 
4 
Although the Court found the Confrontation Clause to bar only certain types of 
"testimonial" statements, it "[left] for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive 
definition of 'testimonial."' 15 The majority acknowledged that the absence of a concrete 
definition of "testimonial" would create turmoil in the lower courts, but reasoned that any 
"interim uncertainty" would not yield results any worse than those reached under Roberts. 16 The 
Court did state that the Confrontation Clause applies to "witnesses," or those who "bear 
testimony" against the accused. 17 It defined testimony as a "solemn declaration or affirmation 
made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." 18 The Court also articulated a "core 
class" of testimonial statements, such as "ex parte in court testimony or its functional equivalent 
... material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was 
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to 
be used prosecutorially." 19 The Court also included in this core class "extrajudicial statements 
... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, 
or confessions" as well as "statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later 
trial."20 
c. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts 
The Court's first opportunity to refine the scope of Crawford and provide a more 
concrete definition of "testimonial" came in 2009 in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. 21 In 
Melendez-Diaz, the defendant was arrested and charged with distributing and trafficking in 
15 !d. at 68. 
16 !d. at 68 n. 10. 
17 !d. at 51. 
18 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). 
19 !d. 
20 !d. at 51-52. 
21 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
5 
cocaine. 22 At trial, the prosecution introduced bags of a white powdery substance that had been 
found in the defendant's possession.23 Three "certificates of analysis" were also admitted from 
the state forensic laboratory that reported the weight of the seized bags and stated that the bags 
had been "[e]xamined with the following results: The substance was found to contain: Cocaine." 
24 As required by Massachusetts law, the certificates were sworn before a notary public and 
submitted as prima facie evidence of what they asserted.25 The defendant's counsel objected, 
claiming Crawford required the analysts to testify in person. 26 The trial court disagreed, and the 
certificates were admitted as prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight 
of the narcotic analyzed, and petitioner was convicted. 27 On appeal, the Supreme Court was left 
to decide whether the "certificates of analysis" were testimonial, rendering the affiants 
"witnesses" subject to the defendant's right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.28 
Applying the Crawford test, the Court held that the admission of the certificates violated 
the Confrontation Clause because they were created for the "sole purpose of providing evidence 
against the defendant" and were, "quite plainly, affidavits."29 The court found the certificates 
tantamount to live, in-court testimony because they did precisely what the analyst would do on 
direct examination: testify that the substance found in the possession of Melendez-Diaz and his 
co-defendants was cocaine.30 Accordingly, the Court held that the certificates were testimonial 
statements and could not be introduced into evidence unless their authors were subject to the 




26 Jd. at 309. 
27 Melendez Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 309 (2009). 
28 I d. at 307. 
29 I d. at 311; id. at 330 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
30 I d. at 3 1 0-11. 
6 
------
"crucible of cross-examination." 31 Because there was no evidence that the analysts were 
unavailable to testify at trial and that petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, 
the Court held that Melendez-Diaz was entitled to confront them at trial. 32 In requiring 
confrontation, Melendez-Diaz refused to create a "forensic evidence" exception to Crawford, 
holding that a forensic laboratory report, created specifically to serve as evidence in a criminal 
proceeding, ranked as testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes. 33 
d. Bullcoming v. New Mexico 
Just two years after Melendez-Diaz, the Court in Bullcoming v. New Mexico was once 
again asked to refine the scope of the Confrontation Clause, this time with respect to surrogate 
testimony. 34 The main issue in Bull coming was whether in-court testimony of an analyst who 
did not sign, perform, nor observe the test was sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. 35 
At defendant's trial for driving while intoxicated, the court admitted into evidence a forensic 
report certifying that the defendant's blood-alcohol concentration was well above the threshold 
for an aggravated DWI. 36 The report also certified that the testing analyst had received the 
sealed blood sample intact and followed the prescribed laboratory procedures when testing the 
sample.37 Instead of calling Curtis Caylor, the analyst who completed, signed, and certified the 
report to testify, the prosecution called another analyst, Gerasimos Razatos, in his place. 38 
Although Razatos was familiar with the lab's general testing devices and procedures, he had 
neither participated in nor observed the test on defendant's blood sample, making him Caylor's 
31 I d. at 317 quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
32 Id. at 311. 
33 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705,2713-14 (2011). 
34 131 S. Ct. 2705 (20 11 ). 
35 Id. at 2710. 
36 Id. at 2711-12. 
37 ld. at2710. 
38 I d. at 2712. 
7 
surrogate.39 Defendant's counsel objected on Confrontation Clause grounds, but the trial court 
overruled the objection and permitted Razatos to testify.40 Although acknowledging that the 
report at issue qualified as testimonial under Melendez-Diaz, the trial court nonetheless held that 
its admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the Caylor was a mere scrivener 
and Razatos qualified as an expert witness with respect to the lab procedures and testing 
machine.41 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's conviction and held that the 
Confrontation Clause did not permit the introduction of a forensic laboratory report containing a 
testimonial certification made in order to prove a fact at a criminal trial through the in-court 
testimony of an analyst who did not sign the certification nor personally perform or observe the 
test reported.42 As with the narcotics report at issue in Melendez-Diaz, the Court found that the 
blood-alcohol report fell squarely within the core class of testimonial statements enunciated in 
Crawford.43 Although not notarized, the Court found the report sufficiently formal to qualify as 
testimonial.44 With respect to the surrogate testimony, the Court declined to accept Razatos's 
testimony despite the fact that he was a knowledgeable representative of the laboratory who 
could explain the lab's processes and details of the report. 45 The Court emphasized that 
surrogate testimony is insufficient under the Confrontation Clause because it cannot convey what 
the certifying analyst knew or observed about the test and testing procedures, or expose any 
lapses or lies in the report.46 The Court stated simply, "[t]he accused's right is to be confronted 
39 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705,2706 (2011). 
40 /d. at 2712. 
41 /d. 
42 /d. at 2713. 
43 /d. at 2717. 
44ld. 
45 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705,2710 (2011). 
46 ld. at 2715. 
8 
with the analyst who made the certification." 47 Faithfully applying the Crawford test, the Court 
held that the report could not be introduced at trial because the State never asserted that Caylor 
was unavailable and defendant was not given the opportunity to cross-examine him. 48 
While concurring in the plurality's result, Justice Sotomayor wrote separately to 
emphasize the fact that the forensic report had been admitted into evidence for the purpose of 
proving the truth of the matter asserted. 49 Although she did not opine on the matter, Justice 
Sotomayor stated that the Court would face a different question if it was asked to determine the 
constitutionality of allowing an expert witness to discuss another analyst's testimonial statements 
if the testimonial statements themselves were not admitted as evidence. 50 This precise 
hypothetical was presented to the court barely a year later in Williams v. Illinois. 
III. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE IN FLUX: WILLIAMS V. ILLINOIS 
On June 18, 2012, almost a decade after rejecting the indicia of reliability standard of 
Ohio v. Roberts as too malleable to protect against "paradigmatic confrontation violations," the 
Supreme Court took a major step towards its revival in Williams v. Illinois. 51 In Williams, the 
defendant was accused of rape, and at the bench trial, the prosecution introduced the testimony 
of Sandra Lambatos, a forensic specialist at the Illinois State Police Lab ("ISP"). 52 Lambatos 
testified that she matched a DNA profile produced by an outside laboratory, Cellmark, to a 
profile that the state police provided of Williams' blood. 53 She also testified that Cellmark was 
an accredited crime lab and that records reflected that the vaginal swabs taken from the victim, 
47 !d. at 2710. 
48 Jd. at 2714. 
49 Jd. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
50 ld. 
51 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60. 
52 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2223. 
53 ld. 
9 
L.J., were sent to Cellmark and returned. 54 Importantly, Lambatos did not make any statements 
regarding how Cellmark handled or tested the sample nor did she vouch for the accuracy of 
Cellmark's profile. 55 The defense moved to exclude Lambatos's testimony on Confrontation 
Clause grounds insofar as it implicated events at Cellmark, but the trial court admitted the 
evidence and found Williams guilty. 56 Both the Illinois Court of Appeals and the State Supreme 
Court affirmed, holding that Lambatos' s testimony did not violate petitioner's confrontation 
rights because the Cellmark report was not offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. 57 On appeal, the Supreme Court held on two separate, independent bases that there was 
no Confrontation Clause violation. 58 
a. The Cellmark Report Was Not Offered for the Truth of the Matter Asserted 
The first part of the Court's opinion focused on one of the hypotheticals set by Justice 
Sotomayor in her concurrence in Bullcoming, regarding the constitutionality of allowing an 
expert witness to discuss another expert's testimonial statements when the statements themselves 
are not admitted as evidence.59 Historically, the Court has held that the Confrontation Clause 
does not bar the use of testimonial statements admitted for purposes other than establishing the 
truth of the matter asserted. 6° For example, out-of-court statements referenced by an expert 
solely for the purpose of explaining the assumptions on which his opinion rests are not offered 
for their truth and thus fall outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause. 61 Here, the Court 





58 Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). 
59 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
60 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2235 (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985)). 
61 !d. at 2228. 
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Cellmark was an accredited lab, the ISP occasionally sent forensic 
samples to Cellmark for DNA testing, according to shipment 
manifests admitted into evidence, the ISP lab sent vaginal swabs 
taken from the victim to Cellmark and later received those swabs 
back from Cellmark, and finally, the Cellmark DNA profile 
matched a profile produced by the ISP lab from a sample of 
petitioner's blood.62 
Significantly, Lambatos did not testify to the truth of any other matter concerning Cellmark and 
made no other reference to the Cellmark report, which was not admitted into evidence. 63 She 
also did not vouch for the quality of the work performed by the diagnostic lab or testify 
regarding anything that was done at the Cellmark lab. 64 While Justice Kagan took issue with 
Lambatos's reference to petitioner's DNA profile, Justice Alito equated it as a mere premise of 
the prosecutor's question which Lambatos assumed to be true when she gave her answer 
indicating that there was a match between the two DNA profiles. 65 For these reasons, the 
plurality concluded that the Cellmark report was not offered for its truth and therefore there was 
no Confrontation Clause violation. 66 
b. The Cellmark Report Was Non-Testimonial 
More significant for Sixth Amendment jurisprudence IS the plurality's second 
independent basis for concluding that no Confrontation Clause violation occurred; that the 
Cellmark report, even if introduced for its truth, was non-testimonial.67 Abandoning nearly a 
decade of precedent, Justice Alito and the plurality reasoned that because the introduction of a 
DNA report prepared by a modem, accredited laboratory bore little, if any, resemblance to the 
historical practices that the Confrontation Clause aimed to eliminate, there was no Sixth 




66 Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2237 (2012). 
67 /d. at 2242. 
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Amendment violation. 68 The Court then stated that the only modem day practices prohibited by 
the Confrontation Clause are those that (1) involve out-of-court statements having the primary 
purpose of accusing a targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct and (2) involve 
formalized statements such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.69 
Although a similar primary purpose test had been utilized to determine whether a 
statement was made for the primary purpose of providing evidence, the Court, prior to Williams, 
had never suggested that the statement must also be meant to accuse a previously identified 
individual to qualify as testimonial.70 In fact, "[w]here this test comes from is anyone's guess," 
as it derives neither from the text nor the history of the Confrontation Clause and has no basis in 
the Court's precedents.71 Not a single post-Crawford case ever utilized or even hinted at this 
type of "accusation test."72 Even Justice Thomas rejected the plurality's primary-purpose test as 
lacking grounding in any constitutional text, history, or logic. 73 He described this type of test as 
"disconnected from history," "divorced from solemnity," and "unworkable in practice." 74 
Nevertheless, the plurality concluded that the Cellmark report "plainly" was not prepared for the 
primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual or creating evidence for trial, but to respond on 
. 75 
an ongoing emergency. 
In finding that the Cellmark report's primary purpose was to catch a dangerous rapist 
who was still at large, the Court misapplied and impermissibly expanded the ongoing emergency 
68 Jd. at 2242. 
69 ld. (emphasis added). 
70 I d. at 2274 (Kagan J., dissenting) (citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 313 (rejecting a related argument that 
laboratory analysts are not subject to confrontation because they are not accusatory witnesses)). 
71 I d. at 2273. 
72 Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2274 (2012). 
73 Id at 2262 (opinion concurring in the judgment). 
74 !d. at 2261-62. 
75 I d. at 2243-44. 
12 
test set forth in Hammon v. Indiana. 76 The test, as originally articulated in Hammon holds 
statements to be non-testimonial when they are given within minutes of an event by frantic 
victims of criminal attacks because the statements are made to enable police to respond to an 
ongoing emergency and not to create evidence for trial. 77 In contrast, in this case, Lambatos 
herself testified that "all reports . . . were prepared for this criminal investigation . . . [a ]nd with 
the purpose of eventual litigation;" in other words, for the purpose of producing evidence, not 
enabling emergency responders. 78 Significantly, it took over a year for the semen on L.J.'s 
vaginal swabs to be tested and a report sent to the police. 79 Given this timeline, it strains 
credulity to assert that the police and Cellmark were primarily concerned with the exigencies of 
an ongoing emergency rather than producing evidence in the ordinary course. 80 To apply the 
ongoing emergency doctrine in this case, where the swabs were not sent by police to Cellmark 
until nine months after the rape and were not received for another four months would be to 
stretch the ongoing emergency test beyond all recognition.81 Despite the plurality's contention, 
the Cellmark report is, in every conceivable respect, a statement meant to serve as evidence in a 
potential criminal trial, and thus is testimonial under the Confrontation Clause. 
The plurality also attempted to distinguish the Cellmark report from the reports at issue in 
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, stating that in the latter cases, the reports were the equivalent of 
affidavits made for the purpose of proving the guilt of a particular criminal defendant at trial and 
prepared by technicians who knew their contents (an elevated blood-alcohol level and the 
presence of an illegal drug) would be incriminating. 82 Here, the Court claimed that the Cellmark 
76 547 U.S. 813 , 822 (2006). 
77 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2274 (2012) (Kagan, J. , dissenting) citing Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155. 
78 Jd. 
79 Jd. 
80 I d. at 2262-63 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
81 !d. at 2274 (Kagan, J. , dissenting). 
82 I d. at 2243 . 
13 
report could not possibly have been generated to prove the guilt of a particular individual since at 
the time ISP sent the sample to Cellmark, petitioner was neither in custody nor under suspicion. 83 
Instead, the primary purpose of the Cellmark report was to generate an objective profile of a 
then-unknown suspect's DNA.84 Viewed side-by-side with the Bullcoming report, however, the 
Cellmark analysis has a comparable title; similarly describes the relevant samples; test 
methodology and results; and includes the signatures of laboratory officials. 85 It also established 
"some fact" in a criminal proceeding, the identity of L.J.' s attacker and detailed the results of 
forensic testing on evidence gathered by police. 86 In all material respects, the Cellmark report is 
identical to the ones at issue in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming.87 
The plurality also emphasized that because no one at Cellmark could have possibly 
known that the profile it produced would inculpate Williams, there was no prospect of 
fabrication or an incentive to produce anything other than a scientifically sound and reliable 
profile. 88 However, as stated by Justice Kagan in her dissent, the problem with laboratory 
analyses has more to do with careless and incompetent work and less to do with personal 
vendettas. 89 For example, a study conducted in 2009, merely three years before the Court's 
decision in Williams, concluded that invalid forensic testimony contributed to convictions in 
60% of the cases where exonerating evidence resulted in the overturning of criminal 
convictions. 90 If one of the goals of cross-examination is to expose an analyst's lack of proper 
83 Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2243 (2012). 
84 Id. at 2251. 
85 I d. at 2267 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
86 I d. at 2266-67. 
87 I d. at 2266. 
88 /d. at 2244 citing Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157. 
89 Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 , 2274 (2012). 
90 557 U.S. 305, 319 (citing Garret & Neufield, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 
VA. L. REv. 1, 14 (2009)). 
14 
training or a deficiency in judgment, it makes not a "whit of difference" whether, at the time of 
the laboratory test, the police already have identified a suspect.91 
In his concurrence, Justice Breyer also reasoned that the Cellmark report was non-
testimonial because statements of that kind do not implicate the principal evil at which the 
Confrontation Clause is directed: ex parte examinations against the accused. 92 In support of that 
proposition, Justice Breyer stated that when a laboratory employee is removed from an 
investigation, operating in the normal course of professional work, and has no way of knowing 
whether the test results will help incriminate or exonerate a particular defendant, "the need for 
cross-examination is considerably diminished."93 However, the requirement that a statement be 
inherently inculpatory is contrary to history as neither law nor practice limited ex parte 
examinations to those witnesses who made inherently inculpatory statements. 94 This 
requirement also makes little sense because a statement that is not facially inculpatory may 
become highly probative of a defendant's guilt when considered with other evidence. 95 
Justice Breyer also looked to the Cellmark report's inherent reliability when finding it 
non-testimonial under the Confrontation Clause. He reasoned that because the Cellmark report 
embodied technical and professional data prepared by analysts in a certified laboratory, it was 
akin to the "regular entries" hearsay exception that presumptively falls outside the category of 
testimonial statements under the Confrontation Clause.96 Further, because the employees were 
operating behind a veil of ignorance that prevented them from knowing the identity of the 
defendant, Justice Breyer found it unlikely that a particular researcher would have a defendant-
91 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2274 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
92 ld. at 2249 citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. 
93 ld. 
94 ld. at 2263 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing 16th century Marian statutes and 17th and 18th century practice 
manuals for magistrates). 
95 ld. 
96 Jd. at 2248-49 (opinion concurring). 
15 
------
related motive to behave dishonestly or misreport test results.97 However, only one year before 
Williams, the Court in Bull coming treated as testimonial a forensic report prepared by a modem 
accredited laboratory and held that it "fell within the core class of testimonial statements" 
implicating the Confrontation Clause.98 The Supreme Court unequivocally rejected a reliability 
analysis when it overruled Ohio v. Roberts, stating that "dispensing with confrontation because 
testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with a jury trial because a defendant is 
obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes."99 Any analyst who writes a 
report that the prosecution introduces must be made available for confrontation even if they 
possess "the scientific acumen of Mme. Curie and the veracity of Mother Teresa."100 
Justice Thomas's concurrence, while rejecting the plurality's holding that the 
introduction of the Cellmark report was not for the truth of the matter asserted, reasoned that the 
report lacked the "formality and solemnity" to be considered testimonial for purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause. 101 Once again, the Court had rejected this exact argument in Bullcoming 
and held that the report at was testimonial even though it was not sworn before a notary 
public. 102 Nevertheless, Justice Thomas found an indicia of solemnity test to better comport with 
the Confrontation Clause than the plurality's "accusatory" test because solemnity had historically 
marked the practice that the Confrontation Clause was originally designed to eliminate: ex parte 
examination of witnesses. 103 Under this rationale, the Confrontation Clause only reaches 
97 Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221,2248-49 (2012) (opinion concurring). 
98 !d. at 2273 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
99 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. 
100 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U .S. at 316 n. 6. 
101 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2255. 
102 Bull coming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717 (reasoning that "the absence of an oath is not dispositive in determining if a 
statement is testimonial." ) 
103 Williams, 132 S. Ct at 2260 (opinion concurring in the judgment). 
16 
"formalized testimonial materials," such as depositions, affidavits, prior testimony, or statements 
resulting from formalized dialogue, such as custodial interrogations. 104 
Applying the indicia of solemnity test to Williams, Justice Thomas concluded that the 
Cellmark report was not testimonial because it was not made by a "witness" or sufficiently 
"solemn."105 Unlike the reports at issue in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the Cellmark report 
was not a sworn or certified declaration of fact or the product of any formalized dialogue 
resembling custodial interrogation even though it was produced at the request of law 
enforcement. 106 Although the report was signed by two "reviewers," they did not purport to have 
performed the DNA testing or certify the accuracy of those who did. 107 Justice Thomas also 
distinguished the Cellmark report from the forensic report at issue in Bullcoming because 
although unsworn, the report included a "Certificate of Analyst" signed by the forensic analyst 
who tested the defendant's blood sample. 108 In contrast, the Cellmark report, in substance, 
certified nothing. 109 In her dissent, Justice Kagan rejected the indicia of solemnity test and found 
only "(maybe) a nickel's worth of difference" between the reports at issue in Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming and the Cellmark report. 110 She stated, "Justice Thomas's approach grants 






108 Jd. citing Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710. 
109 Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2260 (2012). 
110 Jd. at 2276 (opinion dissenting). 
Ill Jd. 
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IV. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE COMES FULL CIRCLE: A RETURN TO 
OHIO v. ROBERTS? 
Almost a decade ago, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the Supreme Court's failure to 
clearly articulate a definition of testimonial in Crawford v. Washington. He stated: 
The Court grandly declares that "[w]e leave for another day any 
effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial,"' ... 
But the thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands 
of state prosecutors need answers as to what beyond the specific 
kinds of "testimony" the Court lists, . . . is covered by the new rule. 
They need them now, not months or years from now. Rules of 
criminal evidence are applied every day in courts throughout the 
country and parties should not be left in the dark in this manner. 112 
In the Supreme Court's third case in as many years, it once again failed to provide a concrete 
definition of testimonial statements. Without of a clear standard to evaluate the reach of the 
Confrontation Clause, the "mantle of uncertainty" that Chief Justice Rehnquist feared has been 
cast over criminal trials post-Williams. 113 Although on its face Williams may seem like a limited 
decision regarding expert testimony not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, the heart of 
the opinion is much more malignant. The Court not only failed to clarify the narrow issue before 
it, but issued a fractured opinion that calls into serious question the entire Crawford line of cases. 
a. The "Narrowest Grounds" of the 4-1-4 Holding 
The decision in Williams reveals significant discord amongst the Justices and a badly-
splintered Court regarding the future interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. The decision 
itself was a 4-1-4 split, with no single opinion garnering the support of a majority of the Court. 
Justice Alito wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, and 
Justice Breyer. 114 Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurrence to express his skepticism of the 
112 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75-76 (opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
113 !d. at 70. 
114 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2227. 
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plurality and dissent's approaches in defining the outer scope of testimonial statements post-
Crawford, specifically in reference to crime-laboratory reports. 115 Justice Thomas concurred in 
the judgment only, and specifically rejected every aspect of the plurality's test. Instead, he found 
the Cellmark report non-testimonial under his own, "indicia of solemnity" test. 116 Justice Kagan, 
joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Sotomayor, dissented from the opinion 
and found it an "open and shut case" under the Court's precedents. 117 Although the plurality 
found Cellmark report to be non-testimonial, the five Justices who joined in the opinion agreed 
on very little and left significant confusion in their wake. 118 No single opinion garnered the 
support of a majority of the Court. The lack of either a majority opinion or a clear holding, in 
addition to the internal flaws of the various opinions, deeply muddles Confrontation Clause 
doctrine. As it stands, Williams leaves the Confrontation Clause's application to forensic 
evidence in question and opens the door for an even more complicated body of cases going 
forward. 119 
By their very essence, plurality opinions are problematic because they leave lower courts 
guessing as to which opinion is binding precedent. 120 The Court in Marks v. United States 121 
addressed this issue and stated: 
115 Jd. at 2244-45. 
116 I d. at 2255. 
117 /d. at 2265. 
118 /d. at 2277 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
119 See, e.g., U.S. v. Turner, No. 08 3109,2013 WL 776802, at *6 (7th Cir. Mar. 4, 2013) ("We begin by noting that 
the 4 1 4 division of the Justices in Williams ... makes it somewhat challenging to apply Williams to the facts of this 
case. As the dissenting opinion in Williams observes, the divergent analyses and conclusions of the plurality and 
dissent sow confusion as to precisely what limitations the Confrontation Clause may impose ... ") 
120 !d. 
121 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
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When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the 
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, "the holding of the Court may be viewed 
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds. 122 
Even with Marks in mind, discerning the "narrowest grounds" of the plurality and concurring 
opinions in Williams seems to be challenging at best. Assuming the "not for the truth" rationale 
could even qualify as the narrowest ground given that it was expressly rejected by five Justices, 
its grounds are broader than the non-testimonial approach. 123 Indeed, in the few months since 
Williams was decided, courts have consistently rejected the plurality's "not for truth" rationale as 
invalid and not supported by a majority of the Court. 124 With respect to the second independent 
basis for the decision, the plurality held that the Cellmark report was non-testimonial because it 
was not accusatory, was produced when the perpetrator was at large and before the defendant 
was under suspicion, and was not inherently incriminatory. 125 Justice Thomas, on the other 
hand, held that the Cellmark report was non-testimonial because it lacked sufficient formality 
and solemnity. 126 "Which of these is the narrower grounds? I have no idea." 127 
Instead of having broader and narrower opinions, Williams may present a case where the 
opinions are just different. 128 Courts have already begun to speculate that there simply may not 
122 !d. at 193. 
123 Jessica Smith, Confrontation Clause Update: Williams v. 111inois and What It Means for Forensic Reports, 
ADMIN. OF JUST. BULL., UNIV. OFN. C. AT CHAPEL HILL SCH. OF GOV'T 1, 9 (September 2012) 
http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/pdfs/aojb1203.pdf. 
124 See, e.g., State v. Manion, 295 P. 3d. 270, 280-81 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) ("After Williams, the question is 
whether the lead opinion's first rationale-that testimonial statements admitted for a purpose other than for their truth-
is valid. For the reasons explained in Justice Kagan's opinion, we think not. That is because five Justices of the 
Court disavowed that rationale."); State v. Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d 905, 922 (W.Va. 2012) ("[W]e find Williams a 
tenuous and highly distinguishable opinion which does not, with majority support, dispense with the issue of to what 
extent a surrogate expert may 'rely' upon testimonial hearsay.") 
125 Smith, supra note 125. 
126 !d. 
127 Kent Scheidegger, Making Sense a/Williams v. 111inois, CRIME AND CONSEQUENCES BLOG (June 18, 2012) 
http://www .crimeandconsequences.com/crimblog/20 12/06/making-sense-of-williams-v-ill.html. 
128 Smith, supra note 125. 
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be a "narrowest ground" of Williams. 129 According to Justice Liu in his dissent in People v. 
Lopez, "[as of Oct. 15, 2012] [n]o published lower court decision, state or federal, that has 
examined Williams has identified a single standard or common denominator commanding the 
support of a five-justice majority."130 "When it is not possible to discover a single standard that 
legitimately constitutes the narrowest ground for a decision on that issue, there is then no law of 
the land because no one standard commands the support of a majority of the Supreme Court."131 
In that case, the only binding aspect of such a splintered decision is its specific result. 132 
In State v. Kennedy, the Court of Appeals of West Virginia stated, "we construe Williams 
with extreme caution and admonish lower courts to do likewise."133 The lack of guidance in the 
opinion leaves lower courts with incredible difficulty in deciding which parts of the opinions to 
follow, leading to an even more problematic situation where courts look to the various arguments 
made in each opinion, whether technically binding or merely dicta, for guidance. 134 
b. Confusion in the Court System 
Williams's principal fault is the failure to issue a majority opinion, leaving chaos at the 
lower court level in the wake of its 4-1-4 decision. While five votes approve the admission of 
129 See, e.g., Kennedy, 229 S.E.2d at 916 ("[W]e need not determine what the 'narrowest grounds' obtaining 
concurrence in Williams are, or whether there are any such grounds, for that matter."); People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 
469, 483 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting) ("The United States Supreme Court's most recent decision in this area 
produced no authoritative guidance beyond the result reached on the particular facts of that case.") 
130 286 P.3d at 484. 
131 U.S. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp, 315 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir. 2003). 
132 Id. 
133 229 S.E.2d at 919. 
134 Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REv. 266, 272-73 (2012); See, e.g., Lopez, 286 P.3d at 485 (Liu, J., dissenting) 
("[I]t is a mistake to contend ... that we should resolve confrontation clause cases by determining what would gamer 
the votes of the five justices who supported the outcome in Williams. That approach-cobbling together the 
nonoverlapping rationales put forward by Justice Alito and Justice Thomas in Williams-does not identify a "single 
standard" or "common denominator" on which five justices of the high court agree."); United States v. Pablo, No. 
09-2091,2012 WL 3860016 at *8 (lOth Cir. Sept. 6, 2012) ("[W]e cannot say the district court plainly erred ... as it 
is not plain that a majority of the Supreme Court would have found reversible error ... it appears that five Justices 
would affirm the district court in this case, albeit with different Justices relying on different rationales as they did in 
Williams ... "); 
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the Cellmark report, not a single good explanation is given as to why. 135 The decision has left 
scholars, practitioners, prosecutors, law enforcement agencies, and crime labs shaking their 
heads in dismay. "Yesterday's decision in Williams v. Illinois should have been simple. But not 
with these justices." 136 "[W]hat a bloody mess!" 137 "With such confusion, can Williams v. 
Illinois really be called a decision at all?" 138 "[G]uidance for future expert testimony remains 
wanting." 139 "[L]eaves questions unanswered." 140 "[N]othing short of a jurisprudential 
disaster ... " 141 "If one of the jobs of the United States Supreme Court is to give practitioners 
guidance on what is allowable in the courtroom, the court has failed when it comes to the effect 
of the Confrontation Clause."142 
In the short time since Williams has been decided, uncertainty about how to evaluate 
testimonial statements has already surfaced in lower court opinions. 143 For example, in Hall v. 
State, 144 the Texas Court of Appeals faced the issue of whether the trial court's admission of a 
drug analysis report violated the Confrontation Clause. In its analysis, the appellate court had to 
decide whether Melendez-Diaz/Bullcoming or Williams controlled. 145 The Hall court held that 
135 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
136 Andrew Cohen, The Supreme Court Splinters Apart Over the Confrontation Clause, The Atlantic, (June 19, 
20 12) http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/20 12/06/the-supreme-court-splinters-apart-over-the-
confrontation-clause/25 8634/. 
137 Douglas A. Berman, Williams v. Illinois, the latest SCOTUS Confrontation Clause ruling, finally handed down 
by a deeply divided Court, SENTENCING L. AND POL'Y BLOG (June 18, 2012). 
http:/ I sentencing. typepad. com/ sentencing_ law_ and _policy/20 12/06/williams-v-illinois-the-latest -scotus-
confrontation-clause-ruling-finally-handed-down-by-deeply-divi.html. 
138 Virginia Farrell, Confrontation Clause Confused by Supreme Court 5-4 Decision on DNA Case, CRIM. 
CONVICTIONS BLOG (July 3, 2012) http://www.crimemuseum.org/blog/confrontation-clause-confused-by-supreme-
court-5-4-decision -on-dna -case/. 
139 Supreme Court Watch: Williams Plurality Opinion Raises More Questions About The Admissibility Of Expert 
Testimony, FED. EVIDENCE REv. (June 21, 2012) http://federalevidence.com/node/1557. 
140 Jd. 
141 Ric Simmons, Supreme Court Creates Confusion with Recent Confrontation Clause Ruling, AMICI BLOG, THE 
OHIO ST. UNIV.: MORITZ C. OF L. (last visited March 29, 2013) http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/osjcl/amici-
blog/supreme-court-creates-confusion-with-recent-confrontation-clause-ruling/. 
142 Wade V. Davies, Confronting Expert Testimony, 48 TENN. B. J. 30 (Nov. 2012) 
143 Anderson, Jr., supra note 5, at 70. 
144 0 No. 5-10-0084-CR, 2012 WL 3174130 (Tex. App. Ct. Aug. 7, 2012) 
145 ld. at *7-8 
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the case was analogous to Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, partly because "the lab report [was] 
prepared ... after appellant's arrest."146 Although analogizing the case to Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming, the court appears to have adopted the "accusation" test set forth by the plurality in 
Williams. 147 
On the other hand, In Wisconsin v. Deadwiller, 148 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
discussed Williams at length and held that it controlled. The court stated that is was not 
necessary to give a reason for affirming the trial court's admittance of an analyst's testimony 
regarding a DNA profile match based on a different laboratory's report because "the narrowest 
holding agreed-to by the majority [in Williams] ... is that the Illinois DNA technician's reliance 
on the outside laboratory's report did not violate [the] right to confrontation because the report 
was not testimonial."149 In the absence of a true majority opinion or clear holding, courts across 
the country are left struggling with forensic evidence as it relates to the right of criminal 
defendants to confront all the witnesses against them without any clear guidance from the 
Supreme Court. 150 
c. A Standard Going Forward 
Amplifying the uncertainty surrounding the Confrontation Clause is the obvious 
philosophical schism amongst members of the Court regarding how forensic reports should be 
evaluated post-Williams. Indubitably, Williams is the coming to fruition of what had hereto been 
the minority position, as expressed in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, in the majority by the 
146 ld. at *8. 
147 Anderson, Jr., supra note 5, at 70. 
148 No. 2010AP2363-CR, 2012 WL 2742198 (Wis. Ct. App. July 10, 2012) 
149 !d. at *5. 
150 See, e.g., Lopez, 286 P.3d at 485 (Liu, J., dissenting) ("The nine separate opinions offered by [the Supreme Court 
of California] in three confrontation clause cases decided today reflect the muddled state of the current doctrine 
concerning the Sixth Amendment right of criminal defendants to confront the state's witnesses against them.") 
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same rough grouping of Justices. 151 The four dissenters in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming now 
make up the plurality, with Justice Thomas casting the crucial swing vote based on a test that he 
alone espouses. While previously joining Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Kagan and Sotomayor in the 
majority in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, Justice Thomas "switched sides" in Williams for 
purposes of the outcome only, not the rationale. The Court could have avoided such a confusing 
outcome if only a single additional Justice had either joined the plurality to write a majority 
opinion overruling Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming or joined the dissent and strengthened and 
clarified the requirements of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. 152 Instead, the Supreme Court 
displayed, in a relatively simple case, displayed virtually all the dysfunction the justices' most 
vocal and powerful critics ever could realistically contemplate. 153 Although Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming are technically still good law, their once clear holdings now seem hazy in light of 
Williams. 
Post-Williams, lower courts can evaluate Confrontation Clause cases in many ways, most 
of which are in tension with one another. 154 Courts could generally narrow the reach of the Sixth 
Amendment by requiring a certain degree of formality for testimonial statements, as per Justice 
Thomas's indicia of solemnity test or require testimonial statements to be targeted at a particular 
individual, as per the plurality's "accusatory" test. A number of the Justices also seem open to 
returning to the reliability standard of Ohio v. Roberts. Most sensible for courts, however, would 
be to continue to follow the precedents of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming by refusing to extend 
the holding of Williams beyond its specific result. Given the array of possible doctrinal 
151 Michael A. Sabino, & Anthony Michael Sabino, Confronting the "Crucible of Cross-Examination": Reconciling 
the Supreme Court's Recent Edicts on the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, 65 BAYLOR L. REv. 255, 334 
(20 13) 
152 Leading Cases, supra note 136, at 276. 
153 Cohen, supra note 13 8. 
154 Keenan, supra note 12 at 809. 
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approaches left open by Williams, one can only surmise that the Supreme Court will soon weigh 
in again. 155 
1. Justice Thomas's Indicia of Solemnity Test 
Going forward, an argument can be made that Justice Thomas's op1n1on controls 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence because the indicia of solemnity test is the narrowest 
rationale set forth by the Court in Williams. 156 Unfortunately, this test is one that Justice Thomas 
alone espouses. While relevant, the Supreme Court has never relied solely on a statement's 
formality to invoke the Confrontation Clause, and this type of approach has been consistently 
rejected by the Court as "implausible" and likely to make the right to confrontation "easily 
erasable."157 Not only is the indicia of solemnity test contrary to precedent, but it is also subject 
to abuse and unworkable in practice. The formality of a forensic report would have to be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis and it will be impossible to determine which documents were 
genuinely prepared informally and thus fall outside the ambit of the Confrontation Clause and 
which were deliberately left void of certifications or seals to evade the Confrontation Clause. 
Although Justice Thomas qualified the indicia of solemnity test by stating "the Confrontation 
Clause reaches bad-faith attempts to evade the formalized process," states may still be able to 
evade the Confrontation Clause with a wink and a nod, simply by making- in good faith-
forensic reports as informal as possible. 158 
155 Lopez, 286 P.3d at 483 (Liu, J., dissenting) 
156 Jeffrey Fisher, The holdings and implications a/Williams v. Illinois, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 20, 2012), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/the-holdings-and-implications-of-williams-v-illinois/. 
157 Lopez, 286 P.3d at 483 (Liu, J., dissenting); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 n. 3 ("We fmd it implausible that a 
provision which concededly condemned trial by sworn ex parte affidavit thought trial by unsworn ex parte affidavit 
perfectly OK."); Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717 ("As the New Mexico Supreme Court recognized," 'the absence of 
[an] oath [i]s not dispositive' in determining if a statement is testimonial ... [r]eading the Clause in this 
'implausible' manner, the Court noted, would make the right to confrontation easily erasable.") 
158 Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2261. 
25 
Furthermore, Justice Thomas's test, if adopted, would create an unworkable distinction 
between which characteristics of a report make it formal enough to fall within the Confrontation 
Clause and which do not. For example, in Bullcoming, the Court found the forensic report at 
issue to be identical to the one at issue in Melendez-Diaz, "in all material respects," even though 
it was not sworn before a notary public. 159 In Williams, however, Justice Thomas refused to find 
the Cellmark report testimonial because it was not labeled a "certificate." 160 The subjective 
nature of a formality inquiry has already been exposed in the few lower court opinions that have 
attempted to employ the indicia of solemnity test. In US. v. Turner, 161 for example, the court 
deemed the report at issue to be the functional equivalent of the report in Bullcoming. 162 The 
report was both official and signed, constituted a formal record of the results of the laboratory 
tests that the analyst performed, and was clearly designed to memorialize the that result for 
purposes of the pending legal proceedings against the defendant. 163 Nevertheless, the court held 
that although the report was certified, "it was not certified in the sense that Justice Thomas 
deemed relevant." 164 Because of the divided nature of the Williams decision and the difficulty in 
applying it to the facts at hand, the court ultimately "[gave the defendant] the benefit of the 
doubt" and found the report sufficiently testimonial to trigger the protection of the Confrontation 
Clause. 165 If Justice Thomas's test controls Sixth Amendment jurisprudence going forward, the 
opinion in Turner may simply be the first of many to reflect the muddled state of the 
Confrontation Clause and the subjective nature of "solemnity." 
159 131 S. Ct. at 2717. 
160 132 S. Ct. at 2260. 
161 No. 08 3109, 2013 WL 776802 (7th Cir. Mar. 4, 2013). 





2. Primary Purpose of "Accusing a Targeted Individual" Test 
The plurality's new "accusatory" test is arbitrary and equally as flawed as Justice 
Thomas's indicia of solemnity test and serves only to further muddle Confrontation Clause 
analysis. The primary purpose test as originally enunciated in Davis v. Washington, 166 finds 
statements testimonial when "the circumstances objectively indicate ... that the primary purpose 
... is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution."167 In 
Williams, the plurality distorts this test into one requiring testimonial statements to have the 
"primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct."168 
The first problem with the plurality's "accusatory" test is the broad, overarching 
exception it makes for "ongoing emergencies." Traditionally and appropriately, the ongoing 
emergency test has been used to exclude statements made within minutes of a criminal attack by 
frantic victims trying to aid the police in their investigation. 169 In Williams, however, the Court 
stretched the ongoing emergency test beyond all recognition and created a dangerous precedent 
going forward. Extending the ongoing emergency test to cases like Williams where a routine 
forensic report was generated months after the initial attack opens the door for virtually any 
forensic report to be considered non-testimonial as long as the suspect is not yet in custody. 
"[L]et us not confuse 'emergencies' with accusations for Sixth Amendment purposes."'170 
166 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
167 !d. at 822. 
168 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2242. 
169 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2274 (Kagan, J., dissenting); See, e.g., Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) 
("[A] statement does not fall within the ambit of the Cause when it is made 'under circumstances objectively 
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency.'"); 
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, ("[T]he existence of an emergency or the parties' perception that an emergency 
is ongoing is among the most important circumstances that court must take into account in determining whether an 
interrogation is testimonial because statements made to assist police in addressing an ongoing emergency 
presumably lack the testimonial purpose that would subject them to the requirement of confrontation.") 
170 Sabino, supra note 153 at 331. 
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Furthermore, there is no practical or textual justification for limiting the Sixth 
Amendment to statements made only after the accused's identity is known. 171 The very words of 
the Confrontation Clause utterly fail to constrain the time on may become a witness. 172 True to 
the text of the Confrontation Clause, the court in Crawford specifically held that a declarant may 
become a witness before the accused is prosecuted. 173 As a practical matter, it is unrealistic to 
believe that until the suspect is in custody, forensic testing is simply part of a heroic effort to get 
a dangerous criminal off the streets, and only after the suspect is apprehended forensic testing is 
generated in preparation for trial. Given the rationale behind the Sixth Amendment, the right to 
cross-examination should be triggered regardless of whether the suspect has been identified at 
the time the forensic report is prepared and the ongoing emergency exception limited to its 
traditional application. 
Imbedded in Justice Alita's primary purpose test are shades of the flaws fatal to the now-
rejected formulation of Roberts. 174 To the extent that the Williams plurality justifies the 
allo·wance of evidence without the absolute need for confrontation, it paves the way for a return 
to the inadequacies of Roberts. 175 
3. Ohio v. Roberts's Reliability Test 
In the wake of Williams, the stars seem to be aligned for the overruling of Crawford v. 
Washington and a return to the reliability standard of Ohio v. Roberts. While some scholars find 
a return to the reliability analysis of Roberts unlikely, since Crawford a majority of the Justices 
have joined opinions that suggest the importance of reliability (or, the dangers of unreliability) to 
171 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2262 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
172 Sabino, supra note 153 at 332. 
173 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51 (rejecting the view that the Confrontation Clause applies only to in-court 
testimony). 
174 Sabino, supra note 153 at 330. 
175 !d. 
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proper Confrontation Clause analysis. 176 Members of the Court have even written separately to 
suggest that they are open to reconsidering Sixth Amendment issues. 177 Some scholars have 
even opined that not only does a coalition of justices exist that could overrule Crawford, but that 
the Court's decision in Williams arguably does in fact overrule it. 178 
Williams highlighted a desire to return to the reliability standard of Roberts. The 
plurality emphasized that "reliability is a salient characteristic of a statement that falls outside the 
reach of the Confrontation Clause." 179 To downplay the need for confrontation when "reliable" 
statements are at issue, Justice Alito reasoned that because no one at Cellmark could have 
possibly known that the profile they produced would inculpate Williams, or anyone else for that 
matter, there was no "prospect of fabrication" and no incentive to produce anything other than a 
scientifically sounds and reliable profile. 180 Justice Breyer agreed, stating that because the 
employees were operating behind a veil of ignorance, it was unlikely that a particular researcher 
had a defendant-related motive to behave dishonestly or misrepresent a step in the analysis or 
misreport test results.181 
176 Ben Trachenberg, Confronting Coventurers: Coconspirator Hearsay, Sir Walter Raleigh, and the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause, 64 FLA. L. REv. 1669, 1708 (2012) (quoting George Fisher, Williams v. Illinois: 
Case Note, at 13-17 (June 25, 2012)) ("[T]he urge to root the rationale and reach of the Confrontation Clause to the 
apparent unreliability of contested hearsay evidence has gripped at least five members of the Court ... [T]he broader 
question is whether the revival of reliability reasoning someday might claim a stable court majority."); But see, 
Anderson, Jr. , supra note 5, at 71 ("Of course, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will return to the Roberts 
standard ... ") 
177 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2242 n. 13 (plurality opinion) ("Experience might yet show that the holdings in [post-
Crawford] cases should be reconsidered for the reasons, among others, expressed in the dissents the decisions 
produced. Those decisions are not challenged in this case and are to be deemed binding precedents, but they can and 
should be distinguished on the facts here."); !d. at 2248 (Breyer, J., concurring) (advocating for reargument so the 
parties and amici can discuss, "not only the possible implications of our earlier post-Crawford opinions, but also any 
necessary modifications of statements made in the opinions of those earlier cases.") 
178 Crump, supra note 4 at 150, 155 ("In fact, one can argue that the Court now has overruled Crawford's wholesale 
exclusion of testimonial evidence- in Williams, sub silentio, by a majority that excludes only the narrower category 
of manufactured statements. An explicit opinion discarding the old regime would be preferable, but perhaps the 
reality that Crawford has been overruled already exists.") 
179 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2243 . 
180 !d. at 2243-44. 
181 !d. at 2248-49. 
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However, this argument is little more than an invitation to return to the overruled 
decision in Roberts, which held that evidence with "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" 
was admissible notwithstanding the Confrontation Clause. 182 As stated by the Court in 
Melendez-Diaz and reaffirmed in Bullcoming, the Constitutional right to the Sixth Amendment 
may not be disregarded at the Court's convenience. 183 Almost a decade ago, the Supreme Court 
in Crawford made it clear that it is not enough for testimonial statements to be reliable to fall 
outside the ambit of the Confrontation Clause. The Court stated: 
Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the 
Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the 
vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions 
of 'reliability.' Certainly none of the authorities discussed above 
acknowledges any general reliability exception to the common law 
rule. Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is 
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation. 184 
There is no reason to believe that a reliability inquiry will be any less "murky, subjective, 
inconsistent, or unworkable" now than it was thirty years ago. 185 This test was deemed by 
scholars as "devaluing the Confrontation Clause" and an "amorphous and mystifying evidentiary 
doctrine" whose value was widely questioned. 186 Further, it was found to insufficiently protect 
defendant's rights by abdicating the Supreme Court's responsibility for regulating the admission 
of hearsay and instead relying on evidence law to control the content of the Confrontation 
Clause. 187 Any return to a reliability mode of analysis must be avoided as it is antithetical to 
Crawford's explicit ouster of Roberts and the latter's now discredited theorems. 188 
182 448 U.S. at 66. 
183 557 U.S. at325; 131 S. Ct. at2718. 
184 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
185 Bib as, supra note 13 at 189. 
186 Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L. J. 1011, 1022 (1998). 
187 Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 557, 622 
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4. Primary Purpose of "Providing Evidence" Test 
The most sensible doctrinal approach for lower courts to take post-Williams is Justice 
Kagan's "evidentiary" primary purpose test. This test is most faithful the Supreme Court's 
h . . . . . b k c ,£ d 189 aut ontatlve pronouncements In pnor cases going ac to raw1 or . In Crawford, 
"statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial" were deemed 
within the "core class" of testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause was designed to 
protect against. 190 This definition was reaffirmed in both Davis and Melendez-Diaz. 191 
Similarly, in Bullcoming, the Court stated, "a document created solely for an 'evidentiary 
purpose' ... made in aid of a police investigation ranks as testimonial."192 
While there may be alternative pathways to evaluating forensic evidence, the Constitution 
recognizes only one - confrontation. The Court does not have license to suspend the 
Confrontation Clause when a preferable trial strategy is available. 193 Just as the sky did not fall 
in 2009 after the Supreme Court mandated confrontation in Melendez-Diaz, neither will rigid 
adherence to the Crawford test going forward. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although it seems clear that Crawford and its progeny are endangered, what will replace 
it is anyone's guess, as no proposed alternative has commanded the support of a majority of the 
Court. In fact, with the Court evenly divided on this issue, the controlling vote on any cases 
involving expert testimony belongs to Justice Thomas- who will decide the case based on a test 
189 Lopez, 286 P.3d at 490 (Liu, J., dissenting) 
19
° Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52. 
191 557 U.S. at 310-11. 
192 131 S. Ct. at2717. 
193 Melendez Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318. 
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that none of the other Justices agree with. 194 One can only hope that the Supreme Court will 
weigh in on the Confrontation Clause again in the near future and provide a more coherent, 
workable standard to evaluate testimonial evidence. Until that time, however, lower courts 
should take Williams for what it is - a fractured 4-1-4 opinion that stands for little more than the 
facts it was decided upon. "For now, the Crawford revolution- as some have called it- lives 
on. But its foothold also appears to be somewhat more tenuous than before."195 
194ld. 
195 Fisher, supra, note 158. 
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